@GrapheneOS @lumi @alexia The current default software stack for desktop Linux is kind of terrible and the lack of coherent threat model or proper ecosystem of sandboxed applications are major issues with desktop right now. What I am still questioning is whether it is even possible to make a proper competitor to ChromeOS (if we ignore the hardware insecurity of basically all PCs).
So example software choices:
systemd -> dinit or s6
sudo -> s6-sudo (setuidless)
glibc -> muslc
glibc malloc or jemalloc -> hardened_malloc, malloc-ng, or mimalloc-secure (which supports more CPU architectures)
bubblewrap (sandbox used by Flatpak) -> #syd (it's written in Rust, has many important exploit protections, and can even be the user login: https://gitlab.exherbo.org/sydbox/sydbox)
GNOME or KDE -> XFCE (when their new Rust Wayland native WM is finished)
gnutils -> *BSD or uutils
The issue of course with most of these alternatives is that they are separate projects and therefore dont have the same goals, methods, or threat models. Also most of these projects are written in C which does not help at all. Also there is of course the lack of a proper chain of trust from the hardware to loading the kernel and userspace.
It may just not be reasonably possible to provide a alternative without millions of dollars of funding and a decade of development. It would be nice for there to be an alternative to AOSP/ChromeOS or even MacOS for desktop computing which actually takes security seriously. It doesnt even need to have be completely on par when it comes to security, just do better than current Linux distros (not a very high bar).
What are your thoughts on what to do in case the day comes that Google kills AOSP?